Buffalo Law Review
Volume 20

Number 1

Article 17

10-1-1970

Parental Right to Inspect School Records
Gerald Morreale

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gerald Morreale, Parental Right to Inspect School Records, 20 Buff. L. Rev. 255 (1970).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol20/iss1/17

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COMMENT
PARENTAL RIGHT TO INSPECT SCHOOL RECORDS
Two telephone conversations with a president of The Association for
Children With Learning Disability* may serve to furnish a hypothetical
situation as an introduction to this study of a parent's right to inspect the
school records of his child. A certain public elementary school has educational programs and facilities for teaching children with so-called learning
disabilities. Suppose Johnny, one such youngster, has an I.Q. that classifies
him as having a learning disability but which is not so low as to classify
him as a so-called mentally retarded person. For a couple of years Johnny's
progress reports, subject grades, tests, achievement score, etc., indicate that
he is progressing well in this special program. Now, suppose Johnny's latest
I.Q. test score "drops" to such a level that he must be "reclassified" and,
on the strength of that I.Q. result, the school authorities wish to transfer
him from the learning disabilities program to a special mentally retarded
program. When Johnny's parents learn of this proposal they object and
request inspection of the child's school records. The parents feel that these
records reveal Johnny's capabilities more accurately than merely one I.Q.
test result and would furnish evidence to counter the decision to reclassify
him. But the parents are told that such records are confidential and inaccessible. Intimidated, the parents regretfully acquiesce. Consequently,
Johnny is branded mentally retarded and will begin to suffer immeasurable
educational, social and personal disadvantages from which he may never
recover.
This pathetic situation could have been avoided if Johnny's parents
had been aware of their right to inspect the school records of their child.
School authorities too often refuse to offer such records for parental inspection-either records involving special programs, such as the one Johnny
was engaged in, or even those relating to general educational programs.
This reluctance manifests itself in stalling techniques and delaying tactics
that discourage most parents from pursuing inspection. But if a parent
refuses to be put off and insists upon inspection, the school authorities will
usually comply.
A parent's right to inspect the school records of his child is related to
a deeply rooted right of citizens to inspect public documents of many kinds.
On May 26, 1970 and again on June 12, 1970, this writer conversed by telephone
with Mrs. Mary Lang, President of The Association for Children With Learning Disability, a United Fund Agency under the auspices of The United Health Foundation,
220 Delaware Avenue, Suite 209, Buffalo, New York. Mrs. Lang has graciously given permission for publishing the content of those conversations. This writer wishes to acknowledge Mrs. Lang's permission and to express his gratitude for it, and accepts as his own
responsibility the import of any of the above remarks.
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This right, although not readily definable or identifiable in neatly phrased
legal rules and principles, suggests certain legal analogies that may contribute insight into its nature and importance. In examining this parental
right the main focus of inquiry will be placed upon the present status of
New York State law as evinced by Van Allen v. McCleay.1 This leading
New York case will be examined in the light of a decision by the New
York State Commissioner of Education which immediately preceded it and
in the light of common law developments regarding inspection of public
records generally. In addition to the Van Allen case, an alternative approach
will be examined, based upon analysis directed at the scope of the decision
making power and the nature of the interests involved. In this latter consideration, certain analogies will be suggested that will help to identify
more dearly the concept of the parental right under investigation.
I. PRESENT STATUS IN NEW YORK
A Board of Education, with one dissent, had adopted a resolution permitting parents to inspect the records of their children. The dissenting board
member who had voted against this resolution brought an appeal to the
Commissioner of Education. In the decision by then Acting Commissioner
of Education Nyquist, Appeal of Thibadeau,2 it was held that parents, "as
a matter of law," must be permitted to inspect the records of their children.
Such records included "progress reports, subject grades, intelligence quotients, tests, achievement scores, medical records, psychological and psychiatric reports, selective guidance notes and the evaluation of students by
educators." 3 Conceding that "certain records of the kind here involved are
privileged," 4 the Acting Commissioner went on to say: "Such privilege
merely prevents the disclosure of the communication or record to third
parties, i.e, to persons other than the parent and other than the person
making the record."5 He further noted "that the educational interests of
the pupil can best be served only by full cooperation between the school
I. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
2. Matter of the Appeal of Arthur T. Thibadeau, Jr., from Action of the Board of
Education of Union Free School Dist. No. 5 of Hempstead, Nassau County, 1 N.Y. ED.
DEP'T REP. 607 (1960). The sparse record gives no indication of the factual context in
which the issue arose. The appeal was brought under N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 310 (McKinney
Supp. 1969-70) [hereinafter cited as EDuc. LAw].
3. 1 N.Y. ED. DEP'T REP. 607, 608 (1960).
4. Id. EDUc. LAiv § 7611 which related to privileged communication, now covered by
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4507 [hereinafter cited as CPLR]. The latter places the confidential relations and communications between a psychologist and his client "on the
same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client."
5. 1 N.Y. ED. DEP'T REP. 607, 608 (1960).
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and the parents, based on complete understanding of all available infor6
mation by the parent as well as the school."
Four months later the issues present in Thibadeau arose in a judicial
7
context in Van Allen, a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR.
Petitioner Edward J. Van Allen sought an order directing respondents
Edward J. McCleary, East Meadow Superintendent of Schools, to submit
for inspection all of the school records of his son, then a seventh grader
at the Woodland Junior High School. 8 Prompted by word from teachers
at his son's school to the effect that the boy was in need of psychological
treatment and therapy, petitioner retained a private physician. The latter,
with petitioner's written authorization, requested and obtained from the
school psychologist a copy of a report written for the guidance of school
personnel in connection with the student. Petitioner's formal written demand upon the school board that it direct McCleary to make all such
records available for his inspection was refused.0 The board, however, did
offer full cooperation within the confines of its policy, i.e., through report
cards, periodic private conferences with teachers, and interpretations of the
personal file of the child by qualified school personnel.'0 Petitioner insisted,
6. Id. One final cautionary note, however, was added: "It is, of course, to be understood that, at the time of the inspection of such records by the parent, appropriate personnel should be present where necessary to prevent any misinterpretation by the parent
of the meaning of the record, since some of the records here in question may not be
properly evaluated and understood by some parents." This caution was further reflected
two months later in a Formal Opinion of Counsel, No. 92, 1 N.Y. ED. DEP'T REP. 801,
802-05, dated Nov. 17, 1960, regarding the possibility of libel suits against school personnel by parents having been given access to pupil records in accordance with Thibadeau. Counsel wrote that "[t]he basic consideration in this area is that educators have a
grave professional and moral responsibility not to needlessly defame and injure the reputation of others, be they pupils or their parents." Counsel's opinion was that "a carefully
worded professional opinion, rendered in line of duty by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, guidance counselor, principal or teacher, which is reasonably related to the educative process, made in good faith and with diligent regard for the rights of the person
or persons involved, is protected by a qualified privilege against civil actions for damages
based on libel." Counsel also discussed criminal actions for libel, as well as malpractice
actions.
7. CPLR § 7801 provides: "Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to
review, mandamus or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article...."
8. East Meadow public school psychologist Edna Dubliner had administered to young
Van Allen a battery of psychological tests. Subsequently, the public school authorities in
East Meadow had complained that the child's work did not match his high I.Q. For a
first-hand account of petitioner's side of the story, see his book, E. VAN ALLEN, THE
BRANDED CHILD (1964), especially at 36 et seq. Petitioner does not explain the form which
the school authorities' "complaint" took, nor how or even if it was formally communicated to him.
9. Initially, McCleary, in effect, instructed Woodland Junior High School Principal,
Gustave Raitz, not to allow petitioner to see the records. E. VAN ALLEN, supra note 8,

at 37, 40.
10. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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nevertheless, upon resort to the written records and upon compelling their
production by mandamus."
Holding that the parent had a common law right to inspect
his child's
school records and to compel their production, the court, per Justice
Brennan, concluded: "....

absent constitutional, legislative or administrative

permission or prohibition, a parent is entitled to inspect the records of his
child maintained by the school authorities as required by law." 12
In reaching this conclusion the court surveyed New York statutes,
examined pertinent regulations of the New York State Commissioner of
Education, considered the Thibadeau decision and surveyed common law.
The Constitution of the State of New York does not specifically require
school authorities to permit the inspection of records. Nothing in either
Article XI, "Education," or in Article I, "Bill of Rights," deals with this
question. The court noted that Article I, section 1 of the Constitution' l has
been construed not as a grant or a source of rights, but as "a shield against
unwarranted interference with existing rights by any department of the
government."14 New York's Education Law neither grants to nor withdraws
from a parent the right to inspect the school records of his child.'0 The
court further ruled out legislative provisions in non-school contexts which
define "public records" or impose certain limitations upon their inspection.1 6 Concluding its survey of statutory law, the court summarized its
position as follows:
Neither counsel nor the court has been able to discover any
legislation dealing with the nature of the school records at issue
here as being either 'public' . . . or 'confidential' . . . or of the
right of a parent as distinguished from the public at large to in7
spect them.'
11. Id.
12. 27 Misc. 2d at 93, 211 N.Y.S2d at 514.
13. N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § I provides that "[n]o member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by
the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers.. .
14. 27 Misc. 2d at 84, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05.
15. Id. at 84, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 505. EIuc. LAw §§ 141-46 lodge the power of supervision, care, custody and control of all public records of all public offices in the Division
of History and Public Records of the Education Department.
16. E.g., as being "confidential and not subject to inspection by the public or by
persons who might otherwise have a more particular interest in them." The court also
dismissed N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAw § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), providing for inspection
by any taxpayer of records of a municipal corporation, for the reason that "it has been
specifically held that a school district is not a municipal corporation within the meaning
of that section." 27 Misc. 2d at 84, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 505. Unfortunately, the court did not
specify where such holding occurred.
17. 27 Misc. 2d at 85, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
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As for ihe Commissioner of Education's delegated power to regulate,' 8
Van Allen pointed out that the Commissioner's regulations impose a duty
upon trustees and boards of education to maintain for each child cumulative records covering the essential features of the health and physical education progress.19 Among these duties is the following:
[T]o keep the health records of individual children confidential
except as such records may be necessary for the use of approved
school personnel and, with the consent of the parents or guardians,
for the use of appropriate health personnel of cooperating
agencies. 20
The Commissioner's regulations are silent as to the right of the parent to
inspect, the child's records.
In considering Thibadeau2 ' the question of its applicability was presented to the court: Was Thibadeau to apply to boards of education generally or solely to its participating parties? In other words, was Thibadeau
to have the force of a legislative pronouncement or was that determination
essentially a judicial act "affirming the resolution of the local board while
recognizing the rights of similar local bodies to deal with the problem
differently[?]" 22 Conceding that the thrust of Thibadeau might be confined
to the parties before the Commissioner, the court nonetheless urged that
"[o]ther considerations militate against this conclusion,"2 3 and stated that
the nature of the question decided, i.e., the right of parents to resort to
their child's school records, is "manifestly one which calls for uniformity of
18. The source of this power is N.Y. CONSr. art. V, § 4 and EDUc. LAw § 305. The
former source provides that the head of the department of education shall be The Regents
of the University of the State of New York, who shall appoint ". . . a commissioner of
education to be the chief administrative officer of the department." The latter vests in
him the power to "execute all educational policies determined upon by the board of
regents," EDuc. LAw § 305(1>, and to "advise and guide . . . school officers.
EDuc. LAW § 305 (2).

19. "Health" as so used includes "mental hygiene." See N.Y.

REGULATIONS OF THE

155(5), 156(2)-(6) (1964) [hereinafter cited as REGs.].
20. 27 Misc. 2d at 86, 211 N.Y.S. 2d at 507 (quoting from RGs. § 159-b (1), the court's
emphasis).
COMM'R OF EDUCATION §§

21. 1 N.Y.

ED. DEP'T REP.

607 (1960).

22. 27 Misc. 2d at 88, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 509. While the Commissioner's regulations are
construed as legislative acts which are for the regulation of all future cases and for the
guidance of all administrative officers, the Commissioner's judicial decisions can arguably
be taken to apply only to the parties litigant. In support of this latter view, Associate
Commissioner of Education Crewson characterized the Thibadeau case as a "judicial"
decision (in an official communication dated Nov. 21, 1960 to district superintendents of
schools and supervising principals, entitled "Availability of Pupil Records to Parents').
But this is no different from the theory of a "judicial decision" by the courts. In Gwynne
v. Bd. of Ed., 259 N.Y. 191, 181 N.E. 353 (1932), it was held that persons who have not
participated in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education are not necessarily bound
by the decision of the Commissioner, while those who did participate are bound.
23. 27 Misc. 2d at 88, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
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application throughout the State rather than the diversity which would
attend local determination." 24 However, the court refused to interpret
Thibadeau as specifically requiring the school district involved in Van
Allen-which was not a party to that appeal-to provide unlimited inspection of school records by a parent 2 5
The court did not take a stand on the applicability of Thibadeau in
the instant case. It found, instead, that neither the State Constitution nor
the statutes of the Legislature or the administrative regulations of the Education Department afforded a basis for relief. It therefore turned to consider
the common law. The function of education was traditionally performed
by the parents and only "in more recent times was that function delegated
or transferred to school authorities." 26 The adoption of compulsory education in New York State did not deprive a parent of his "natural rights in
the vital area of the education of his child." 27 The court then went on to
assert that "[p]etitioner's rights, if any, stem not from his status as taxpayer
seeking to review the records of a public corporation, but from his relationship with the school authorities as a parent who under compulsory education has delegated to them the educational authority over his child."2 8
Without examining that relationship and after holding "as a matter of
law" that a parent is entitled to inspect the records, the court asserted that:
24. Id.
25. 27 Misc. 2d at 89, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
26. Id. at 90, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11. The court cites Blackstone and J. Stuart
Mill as pointing to the duty of a parent to educate his child and to the strong right
of a parent in common law and his corresponding duty. For a recent discussion of
Blackstonian concepts in this regard, see Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School
Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis,
117 U. PA. L. Rav. 373, 377-84 (1969).
27. 27 Misc. 2d at 91, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 511. The court relied on the version of the
history of the law set out at length in Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 211, 15
N.E.2d 576, 582 (1938), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In the latter
case, Mr. Justice McReynolds' oft-quoted dictum obviously impressed itself upon the
Van Allen court, i.e., "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him or direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize anti
prepare him for additional obligation." 268 U.S. at 535.
28. 27 Misc. 2d at 91, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (emphasis added). The court then proceeded to "support" this assertion by referring to two important cases: People ex ret.
Stenstrom v. Harnett, 249 N.Y. 606, 164 N.E. 602 (1927); Matter of Egan, 205 N.Y. 147,
98 N.E. 467 (1912). It might well be noted that Egan was cited to the effect that when
not detrimental to the public interest, the right to inspect records of a public nature
exists as to persons who have a sufficient interest in the subject matter. State Justice
Brennan carefully referred to Egan as "a guide." As to Stenstrom, although a record was
"not strictly speaking a public record," and although no statute specified "those who were
or were not entitled to inspect it, the fact the record was required by law to be kept by
a public officer, entitled a person with an interest in it to inspect the record." While
Egan was "a guide," the court relied heavily upon Stenstrom and expressly so stated in
these words: "All the factors which prompted the court to issue a mandamus in that
case are present in the case at bar. . . . We are, therefore, constrained to hold as a
matter of law that the parent is entitled to inspect the records." 27 Misc. 2d at 92, 211
N.Y.S.2d at 512-13.
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This is in accord with the common law right of a patient to
inspect his own hospital records...; of a client to be given open
and frank information by his attorney as to the state of his business...; of a stockholder to inspect the records of his corporation
.. ; of a member of a board of education to inspect records compiled by the superintendent of his own school district....
Moreover, it accords with the policy of the Commissioner of
Education of the State of New York as expressed in the Thibadeau
the records as
ruling and as assumed in his regulation establishing
29
confidential except 'with the consent of the parent.'
Two important factors emerge from the Van Allen holding: 30 (1) the
nature of the parent's relationship to school authorities, and (2) the fact
that records are required to be mailitained by law. Both are based on common law.
The common law right to inspect public records can already be discerned in the foregoing discussion centering around the Van Allen case.
Common law inspection extended generally to documents and records which
were of such a public nature that citizens shared a common interest in
them. 31 Reasonable restrictions and conditions could, however, be imposed.
Absent specific restrictions, the right implied that those exercising it should
not take possession of the registry or monopolize the record books so as to
interfere unduly with the work of the office or with the exercise of the right
by others.82 Public policy was sometimes invoked to demand that certain
records be kept secret and free from common inspection. Such secret or
privileged matters included diplomatic correspondence, communications in
police detection relating to apprehension, prosecution and detention of
criminals, and documents and records kept on file in public institutions
concerning care and treatment of inmates.as
Insofar as the duties of public officials to make and keep public records
34
were ministerial, their performance could be compelled by mandamus.
29. 27 Misc. 2d at 92, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
30. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. See 45 Am. JUR. Records and Recording Laws §§ 14-26 (1943). Such records, e.g.,
were statutes and decisions which make the law by which people are governed and by
which they are charged with notice of their conduct; relating to revenues, elections, fees
or official acts; files and copies of documents relating to titles of property by persons who
have or are about to acquire an interest; records of judicial proceedings. The right to
inspect state records that are of interest to the public in general is a right that belongs
to each citizen and taxpayer of the State. Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749
(1928). See also Annot., 85 A.L.R. 2d 1105 (1962).
32. 45 AM. JUR. Records and Recording Laws § 16 (1943). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.
780 (1932); cf. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 391 (1953).
33. 45 Am. JUL. Records and Recording Laws § 26 (1943). See also Annot., 136
A.L.R. 858 (1942).
34. 34 AM. JUR. Mandamus § 78 (n.11 at 867) (1941); Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich.
200, 219 NAV. 749 (1928); Capito v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 587, 64 S.E. 845 (1909); Clement
v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906).
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This remedy was available to compel the performance of a specific and
positive duty imposed by law, and was to be awarded only where the petitioner had the necessary interest. 35 Not generally an absolute right, the
right to inspection of records was enforceable to some extent only in the
discretion of the court which would award or withhold mandamus upon
consideration of all facts and the circumstances of the case.30 Although an
order in the nature of mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, "equitable
principles largely control its issuance and the burden of demonstrating the
necessity and the propriety of its use rests with the petitioner." 37
Two of the cases upon which Van Allen principally relied illustrate
the foregoing common law principles. In the first, Matter of Egan v.Bd. of
Water Supply of City of New York, 3 8 the Board of Water Supply awarded
a contract for construction of a tunnel under the Hudson River to one of
four competing bidders. The award went not to the lowest bidder but to
the second highest of the four. Petitioner applied for writ of mandamus
against the Board to compel inspection of books and records, asserting a
right to inspect based upon section 51 of the General Municipal Law.80
Petitioner neither asserted nor alleged sustaining any special injury in his
person or property, nor did he contemplate bringing a taxpayer's action.
He simply insisted that the Legislature had, by virtue of said enactment,
35. Randolph v. State, 82 Ala. 527, 2 So. 714 (1887); Webber v. Townley, 43 Mich.
534, 5 N.W. 971 (1880); Buck v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391, 21 Am. Rep. 236 (1874). See also
Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1358 (1929).
36. 34 Am. JU. Mandamus § 182 (1941); State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110
Tenn. 549, 75 S.V. 948 (1903).
37. Izzo v. Kirby, 56 Misc. 2d 131, 136, 287 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1968). In this
case the court said that even where a dear legal right is shown, the court must decide
whether in the exercise of sound discretion it will grant or withhold relief: "[M]andamus
is an extraordinary remedy and the courts, in the exercise of judicial discretion, will be
reluctant to issue such a writ if it will cause disorder and confusion in public affairs,
even though a strict legal right to the relief requested has been shown." 56 Misc. 2d at
137, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 1001. Another recent case, Posner v. Rockefeller, 60 Misc. 2d 597,
304 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. 1969), recognized as an "accepted remedy" an art. 78 proceeding
seeking an order in the nature of mandamus and noted "a pronounced trend toward permitting wide latitude to dtizens and taxpayers to institute actions against governmental
bodies and officers." 60 Misc. 2d at 599, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 32. Among authorities there cited
were Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:
Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969). For further modern discussions relating to mandamus re inspection of records, see Rosenbaum v. Present
Common Council of Town of East Bank,-W. Va.-, 169 S.E.2d 756 (1969); Will V.
Dep't of Health & Social Services, 44 Wis. 2d 507, 171 N.W.2d 378 (1969); C.S.D. No. 2
of Town of Coeymans v. N.Y. State Teachers' Retirement System, 23 N.Y.2d 213, 244
N.E.2d 1, 296 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1968); Howard v. Clark, 59 Misc. 2d 327, 299 N.Y.S.2d 65

(Sup. Ct. 1969); Marthann Realty Co. v. Meade, 59 Misc. 2d 274, 298 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
38. 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912).
39. N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAw § 51 (McKinney 1965) which deals with prosecution of
officers for illegal acts, defines certain material to be public records, and provides for
inspection of such by any taxpayer.
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conferred upon him a right or privilege which the Board of: Water Supply
could not lawfully withhold. The court agreed.40 The court in Egan ex
amined the common law and seemed to reach behind the-gatute, citing as
dictum the language from an old English case to the effect that for all persons interested "every officer appointed by law to keep records ought to
deem himself for that purpose a trustee. '41
.
In the second case, People ex rel. Stenstrom v. Harnett, 2 an application
was made on behalf of Maria Stenstrom, as administratrix of her intestate's
goods, chattels and credits, for a peremptory order of mandamus directing
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to furnish her. with
copies of accident reports relating to an accident in which the intestate met
his death. The administratrix claimed that such reports were necessary to
enable her to prepare for trial. In granting mandamus, the trial court indicated certain limitations:
I do not hold that these reports are open generally for inspection to the public, but only to such persons who establish a
proper interest therein, and the bureau can undoubtedly formulate a procedure by which each applicant for inspection will be
required to prove his interest and right of inspection, and that
permitted in proper cases only under reasonable regulation and
43
control.
In reaching this conclusion the trial court distinguished between public
records and records relating to public business. 44 As for the latter, although
on file with a public officer pursuant to statute, "they ought not to be
40. "We think that the right intended to be conferred [by § 51 of N.Y. GEN. MuNIc.
LAW] is as broad as the language used to bestow it and that there is :no limitation thereof
save that found in the provision itself-making the examination subject to reasonable

regulations-or in special statutes relative to the public documents in particular depart-

ments.. " 205 N.Y. at 156, 98 N.E. at 470.
41. King v. Justices of Straffordshire, 6 Adolphus g: Ellis 84 (ca. 1837).
42. 249 N.Y. 606, 164 N.E. 602 (1928).
43. 131 Misc. 75, 79-80, 226 N.Y.S. 338, 344 (1927). Sections 299 (a) and (c) of the N.Y.
H'VAY LAW (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), the court noted, require persons involved in
automobile accidents to report the matter in writing upon forms prepared by the commissioner and containing such information as he shall prescribe. The immediate purpose
of the report is not disclosed by the statute. A public record is one "made by a public
officer in pursuance of a duty, the immediate purpose of which is to disseminate information to the public, or to serve as a memorial of official transactions for public reference."
131 Misc. at 76-77, 226 N.Y.S. at 341. But not every document on file with a public officer
or every memorandum made by a public officer is a public document: "Reports of private
individuals to government officials, even pursuant to statute, correspondence of such
officials in matters relating to private affairs of a citizen, although in connection with
public business, or memoranda of public officers for their own convenience, are not
public documents or records, unless made so by statute." American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Woodbury, 127 App. Div. 455, 112 N.Y.S. 165 (3d Dep't 1908).
44. Absent an express statutory declaration, "the nature and purpose of the record,
and, possibly, custom and usage, must be the guides in determining the class to which
it belongs." 131 Misc. at 77, 226 NXY.S. at 342. See also Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660
(1878).
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ifidiscriminately subject to inspection. However, any person who has an
interest in such record or document should ordinarily be permitted to
inspect it, unless its inspection would obviously be detrimental to public
interest." 45
Common law inspection of records, then, as well as traditional and
modem notions of mandamus reinforce Van Allen's two-fold test: the
parent's relationship with school authorities and the fact that records are
required to be kept by law.
There has been a dearth of litigation subsequent to Van Allen in47
46
volving this parental right. In the only case presenting a similar issue,
petitioner sought inspection of his child's school records. The child was
suffering from brain damage caused by negligence and malpractice of
certain tortfeasors not connected with respondent Board of Education or
the City of New York. Over respondent's objection that the records were
confidential, and citing both Thibadeau and Van Allen, the court granted
petitioner's application on condition that the inspection take place at the
4s
office of the Board of Education under supervision of school personnel.
45. 131 Misc. at 77, 226 N.Y.S. at 342.
46. Only one case involved a parent seeking inspection of a child's school records:
Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of City of N.Y., 31 Misc. 2d 810, 220 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct.
1961). Five other cases did not involve this parental right: Accident Index Bureau, Inc.
i. Hughes, 46 N.J. 160, 215 A. 2d 529 (1965) (regulation of the Commissioner of Labor
and Industry closing workmen's compensation records to public inspection was inappropriate and invalid); Marmo v. N.Y. City Bd. of Ed., 56 Misc. 2d 517, 289 N.Y.S.2d 51
(Sup. Ct. 1968) (petitioner, not a parent, allowed to inspect a specific class roll to obtain
name and address of fellow classmate in order to assist petitioner in defending a criminal
indictment); C. Van Deusen, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 47 Misc. 2d 1094, 263
N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (petitioner's sufficient interest in records maintained pursuant to N.Y. Pun. OFFIcERS LAW § 66); Rome Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt, 43 Misc. 2d 598,
252 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (records kept pursuant to N.Y. Pun. HEALTi LAW
§ 4174 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70)); Trim v. Milham, 42 Misc. 2d 348, 247 N.Y.S.2d 531
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (compulsion of police commissioners to cancel a work schedule alleged
to be in violation of law).
47. Johnson v. Bd. of Ed. of City of N.Y., 31 Misc. 2d 810, 220 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
48. Id. In Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 23 App. Div. 2d 306, 260 N.Y.S.2d 791 (2d Dep't
1965), neither a parent nor school records played a part; the opinion nonetheless gives a
good resume of common law and case law in keeping with the materials already examined
in the foregoing pages. Petitioner, an attorney, sought inspection of the docket book and
docket in possession of the clerk of the Criminal Court of City of New York. Rejecting
the argument that petitioner may not maintain the proceeding since he was not specially
aggrieved, the court, citing Matter of Egan [see supra text accompanying note 38] noted
that English law required as a condition to inspection that the applicant show a special
interest to be served. But, again citing the Egan case, the court further noted that "in
general American courts do not require a showing of special interest by a taxpayer." 23
App. Div. 2d at 309, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 795. Pointing to certain N.Y. statutes which define the
right of inspection of public records and the manner of the exercise of that right, among
which, EDUc. LAW § 144, N.Y. PuB. OFFIcERs LAW § 66 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70), N.Y.
JUDIcIARY LAW § 255 (McKinney 1968) and N.Y. GEN. MUNic. LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp.
1969-70), the court concluded that the general policy of New York State thereby manifested was "to make available to public inspection and access all records or other papers
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The paucity of litigation, the silence in the Commissioner of Education's regulations, and the absence of statutory provisions regarding a
-parent's right of inspection, all indicate that the Van Allen position represents the settled view. No cases have been found to indicate otherwise.
For weight-conscious students of law who prefer heavy authority based on
federal or Supreme Court decisions, Van Allen, which after all is but a
"single lower court" decision, may seem too fragile to support a "settled
view." The type of analysis and exposition which immediately follows
attempts to support Van Allen and thus the settled view.
11. BEYOND Van Allen: A

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

Although the Van Allen case represents the present status in New
York State of the parental right under investigation, that case did not
contribute any significant insight into the nature of the interests involved.
Van Allen merely asserted that the right exists and proferred reasons,
grounded in common law, for justifying it. It did not attempt to define
that right. This inquiry will now shift to identifying that right and placing
it into a larger and perhaps more significant context than the confines of
the Van Allen case.
The question of a parent's right to inspect the school records of his
child lies in the area of decision-making by bodies charged with the
administration of public education. This is "one of the most significant
areas of the law in terms of its effect on lives of individuals and groups in
our society." 49 Suppose that a hypothetical school authority 50 denies a
parent access to his child's school records, as initially done in the Van Allen
kept 'in h public office,' at least where secrecy is not enjoined by statute or rule." 23 App.
Div. 2d at 310, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 796. Once papers are filed with the clerk of the court,
the necessity for secrecy in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals is no longer
present, the court said. Accordingly, the court held that files in the possession of the
clerk of the Criminal Court of the City of New York are public records which may be fully
examined by any person, unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the
court or by the terms of the statute. 23 App. Div. 2d at 311, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
49. Goldstein, supra note 26, at 375. Goldstein asserts that this area is "virtually
ignored by the legal profession." Id. at 375-76. He further notes a dearth of "education
law" casebooks and textbooks. Education law seminars have been recently or are currently
taught at Yale Law School, the University of Pennsylvania Law School and the State
University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. Among books used in schools of education for law courses, Goldstein lists, e.g., R. DRURY 9- K. RAY, PINCIPLES OF SCHOOL LAW
(1965); N. EoWARts, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC ScHoots (rev. ed. 1955); A. FLowERs &
E. BoLmEiER, LAW AND PUPIL CONTROL (1964); E. FULBRIGHT & E. BOLMEIER, COURTS AND
Ti
CURRICULUM (1964); R. HAMmTON & P. MoRT, THE LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (2d
ed. 1959); A. REzNY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SCHOOL BOARDS (1966). "[-]ith the exception of
Dean Hamilton, all of these authors are principally involved in education, not law." Goldstein, supra note 26, at 376 n.ll.
50. The term "school authority" is used to designate the decision-maker (s) within
the school structure, whether he or they be guidance personnel, teacher, principal or
member of the operating body of the local school district.
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case and in the illustration with which this comment began. The source and
scope of power upon which the school authority's decision stands as well
as the nature of the interests involved will be considered in light of this
hypothetical denial.
A. Source and Scope of Power
When a school authority denies a parent access to his child's school
,records it makes a decision that may or may not be considered to be a
rule or regulation. Without examining whether such decision has "adjudicative" or "legislative" force,51 the source and scope of power authorizing
such a decision may be presumed to be the same as that of a rule or regulation. 52 Such source may be found in the first instance in a state constitution.
The New York Constitution, Article XI, Section 1, for example, states, "The
,legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." Another source of power for school authority decisions may be a
state's legislative provisions. For instance, a recent case decided by the
New York Commissioner of Education5 3 speaks of the source as well as the
iscope of the "very broad powers" given to boards of education for the
purpose of enabling them to perform their function, viz., the education
of youth:
Specifically, the board of education has the power to make
such regulations and by-laws as may be necessary to make effectual
the provisions of [the Education Law] . . . and for the...
general management, operation, control, maintenance and discipline of the schools.' . . . The statute further gives the board
of education 'all the powers reasonably necessary to exercise powers
granted expressly and by implication and to discharge duties
imposed expressly or by implication by [the Education Law] or
54
other statutes.
The Commissioner carefully spelled out that such broad powers carry with
them
responsibilities to make such rules and regulations as will contribute to the smooth administration and operation of the school.
It is axiomatic, however, that such rules must clearly relate to
51. That is, does it apply merely to the particular parent in question and solely to
the child's school records, or does it apply as a kind of "policy" applicable to all parents
and all children's school records within a particular school or schools within a particular
school district?
52. At least, this will be the presumption upon which the present discussion rests.
For purposes of this discussion, then, "rule," "regulation," and "decision" will be treated
without distinction; although, in other contexts, it is obvious that distinctions among
these terms may well be extremely relevant and bear significantly upon the kinds of
analyses to be pursued. The "administrative law" context is the most obvious one in
-which such distinctions are of crucial importance.
53. Matter of Dalrymple, Dec. No. 7594, 7 N.Y. ED. DEP'T RPm. 113 (1966).
54. Id. See also EDuc. LAw § 1709.
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the educative process and must be necessary to the protection
thereof.55
Other sources of authority for school decisions may be found in the powers
vested in the State Commissioner of Education to rule and regulate. In our,
hypothetical case, assume that no pertinent rulings, regulations or decisions:
apply. 56 A final source of decision-making power may be considered to be
that which in a school context is the equivalent of common law. For present
analysis this latter source may be considered that body of principles represented by school policy, custom or usage, based upon the expertise of the
staff of the educational structure, regardless of whether such expertise
comes in the form of one or more guidance personnel, teachers, principals,
or members of the operating body of the local school district. Again,
assuming that no pertinent state constitutional or state legislative provisions apply as a source from which denial of a parent's right to resort to
the school records of his child can be derived, 57 this leaves the common
law equivalent as the sole remaining source.
Having considered the source of the decision-making power, the scope.
of this power may now be discussed. Limitations on scope have been sug-.
gested by the Dalrymple case. 58 The permissible scope outlined there was
such decision-making power for the "general management, operation, control, maintenance and discipline of the schools .. .as will contribute to
the smooth administration and operation of the school[s]."5 9 The dimension of this power can be determined by considering the function of schools
in educating the pupils in their charge. For this purpose, Professor Goldstein's two-fold functional analysis of school board power may be utilized.60,
He sees two main categories of the school's function of educating pupils:
(1) Education per se and (2) the school as host to its pupils. The first is
obviously the primary function of schools, but the second is also significant
in that buildings must be maintained in good repair and children must be
protected from harm from each other while they are congregated to55. 7 N.Y. ED. DEP'T RFP. 113 (1966).

56. This supposition is not merely fictitious. As evidenced in the Van Allen case, the.
court there found no guidance with the possible exception of the Thibadeau case, emerging from the Commissioner's rules, regulations or decisions. As for Thibadeau, that determination was treated by the court as "adjudicative" in nature and not to be extended
to apply to the Van Allen situation. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
57. Again, this circumstance is not totally fictitious, since indeed this was found to
be the case in New York, and research regarding other jurisdictions indicates the same
hiatus elsewhere.
58. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 387-422. This article analyzes in nonconstitutional
terms school board authority to regulate student conduct and status. The cases analyzed
deal with expulsion or suspension from schools or from school activities resulting from,,
e.g., student marriages, student pregnancies, fraternity membership, and male students'
hair styles.
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gether. 61 A necessary conditi6n to the validity of a school authority deci.
siorr is that it serve the education. per se, or host functions. That a decision
meets this requirement, however, does not end the inquiry into its validity.0 2
Account must also be taken of the effect that school authority decisions
might have on other societal interests. 63 In the event of a clash, certain
other determinations then have to be made. 64
B. Nature of School Authority's Interest and Other Relevant Interests
There is no reasonable ground for a school authority to deny access to
a parent to his child's records; that is, no ground that would reasonably
relate to either the school's education per se or host function. Arguably, the
school authority might advance three "reasons" for such denial: to avoid
lawsuits, to avoid misinterpretations, and to avoid undue interference with
the operation of the school. These may be summarily dismissed. The first
and second, as was indicated in Thibadeau and by counsel for New York's
Education Department, 65 may be met by competent professionalism on the
part of school authorities. As for the third, if the "fear" is that schools will
be flooded by parents wanting to see their children's records-all at the
same time-and thereby clogging the smooth running of the schools, then
reasonable inspection hours and procedures might easily be set up to
mutually accommodate such parents and concerned school personnel.
Assuming, arguendo, however, that such denial does validly serve
the school's functions, would such a decision affect other interests? It
can readily be conceded that when a school authority evaluates a pupil
it is fulfilling an educational function in that the more one knows about a
child the better the child can be educated. In evaluating a child, a school
61. Id. at 387.
62. Id. "Basic to our societal and governmental structures is the assumption that

certain areas of conduct, if subject to any governmental regulation at all, should be
regulated by the legislature ....
This does not mean that the legislature can never
delegate to subordinate bodies the authority to regulate these areas ....
It does mean,
however, that broad, vague statutory grants of power to such bodies should not readily
be interpreted as including such a delegation of authority. The presumption of our
societal and governmental systems often require that these delegations be explicit." Id.
:at 387-88. See also K. C. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 2-01 to 2-16 (1958); L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 28-86 (1965).
63. "School boards . . . do not operate in isolation, and, particularly at the fringe
of school board authority, school rules may collide with those of other decision makers,
public and private. When this occurs a school board rule cannot be found valid simply
because it serves a valid school board function ....

It

. .

. becomes necessary to deter-

mine which has primacy in each particular case. In the absence of a specific legislative
directive as to primacy, the determination must be made through an examination of
the total statutory scheme (not just the education code) and the background of societal
traditions against which the legislature has enacted this scheme." Goldstein, supra note 26,
.at 388-89.
64. See, e.g., supra note 63.
65. See supra note 6.
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is performing a function that is also parental in nature: parents, consciously
or otherwise, are constantly evaluating their children. Here is an area where
in loco parentis overlaps between the real parent and the delegated parent,
i.e., the school authority. 66 This is perfectly legitimate. Once the school
authority insists on keeping its evaluation of a child secret, then it intrudes
'into the domain of parental prerogative and oversteps its legitimate in loco
parentis authority, for it is obvious that a parent can control publication
of his evaluation of his own child and can keep secret from the world at
large such evaluation.
"Secret law" as one prominent authority puts it, is repugnant to the
American tradition of openness. 67 Judgments are being made and recorded
by school authorities. These follow the child and are circulated among
school authorities, and obviously influence subsequent judgments, opinions
and attitudes relating to the child-subject of such records. A child may be
"branded" 68 in such a way as to cause him undue embarrassment or even
psychological harm. Add to this situation the fact that due to compulsory
attendance laws the student is captive0 9 and the sense of unfairness is
magnified.7 0
C. Nature of Parent'sInterest: A Suggested Approach
The parent who seeks school records seeks information. Information
may be sought in order to avoid classifications detrimental to the child, or
66. For a helpful discussion of the confused, perhaps out-moded, and often misunderstood in loco parentisdoctrine, see Goldstein, supra note 26, at 377-84.
67. K. C. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 6-8 (1965).
68. "Branded" is the word used in the title of Van Allen's book. See supra note 8.
The book's subtitle speaks for itself- "The School Psyche-Snoops Exposed."
69. Compulsory attendance laws exist in all states with the exception of Mississippi,
South Carolina and Virginia (where the matter is left to local option). For a compilation
of state compulsory school laws, see A. STENHILBmR & C. SOKOLOWSKI, STATE LAW ON
CoMPuLsoRY ATITENDANCE (1966). For New York, see EDuc. LAW §§ 3204, 3205, 3208, 3210..

70. To consider the "due process question" suggested by this would extend this
comment beyond its intended scope. Likewise, to consider the function and role of judicial
review, is beyond present purposes. In this latter regard, suffice it to note that whether
school authority is viewed as an agency of state government or as a local government
unit, its function is the same--"[o]perating the public school system . . .[and regulating] public education." Goldstein, supra note 26, at 384-87, esp. at 385 n.46. For a
general discussion of methods of review of administrative action, see L. JAFFE, JuDicuAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcriON 152-260 (1965). The determination of harm to
children or to the educational structure is not the type of determination that courts feel
competent to make: "It involves a whole complex of psychological, sociological and
educational factors that need expertise for their resolution." Goldstein, supra note 26, at
429-30 n.176. Yet, especially since Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U. S.483 (1954), the ultimate
responsibility for determining the validity of school decisions has come to rest more and
more with the judiciary. "As a result, courts are called upon to make difficult determinations that necessarily merge into areas of educational policy, judgments they are naturally
reluctant to make. Yet, absent more definite legislative standards in educational enabling
acts, this is a task they must continue to perform." Goldstein, supra note 26, at 430; cf..
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967); L. JAFFE, sumra at 320-22.
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•in order to assure accuracy and fairness. This parental quest for information
is related to a general right-to-know interest which has found expression in
certain areas of the law, especially as manifested by section three of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 71 as well as the first amendment of the
United States Constitution.72
APA section 3 has been called a "new Freedom of Information Act"
and "Congress' latest attempt at achieving a proper balance between the
public's 'right to know' and the government's need for secrecy."73 It makes
virtually all agency records subject to disclosure unless they fall within one
of nine specific exemptions.74 The only other real limitation on availability
of records is the requirement that the records be identifiable and requested
in accordance with regulations. 75 The former APA requirement of being
"properly and directly concerned" has been eliminated, thus expanding the
class of persons to whom disclosure must be made.7 6 The basic approach of
the Act appears to be sound: it makes all records "presumptively available,
with the agencies bearing the burden of justifying withholding."77 The
fact that a record is covered by an exemption does not require an agency
to withhold it: "As many regulations point out, the exemptions should be
7
used only when actually necessary." T
Freedom of information is also an aspect of freedom of the press which
,has been called "the very foundation for all those freedoms that the first
'amendment of our Constitution was intended to guarantee." 70
71. ADMmisniAiVE PROCEDURE Acr § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 500 (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as APA § 3];. *,
72. Common law, it has already been seen, supra notes 31-45 and accompanying
text, recognized a 'right-to-know interest. In this same vein many state statutes which
create, define or state a general right of inspection of public records recognize this same
interest. In New York, :e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUNiC. LAW § 51; N.Y. Pun. OFFiCFs LAW § 66;
N.Y. SECOND CLASS CrrEs LAW § 241; N.Y. VmL.AGE LAW §§ 68, 82 and 108; N.Y. Crr
CHARTER CHAPTER § 894; N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAw § 16; N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 52(e); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 42.
73. Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and The Regulations, 56 GEo. LJ.
18 (1967).
74. These are: (1) matters "in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy;"
(2) matters related to "internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;" (3) matters
"'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;" (4) "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;" (5) certain
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters;" (6) "personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy;" (7) certain "investigatory files" [except "to the extent
available by law"]; (8) certain reports on financial institutions; and (9) certain geological
,data. APA § 3.
75. See Note, supra note 73, at 25.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 52.
78. Id. at 52-53 & n.249.
79. H. L. CRoss, Tim PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953) (2d Supp. 1959), at Preface,
xii-xiv. The late Dr. Cross, attorney and teacher at Columbia University in the field of
newspaper law, was commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper Editors to
-
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This brief consideration of the nature of a parent's right to resort to
the school records of his child suggests possibilities that were not raised in
Van Allen.
CONCLUSION

By virtue of common law and of the parent's relationship to school
authorities, as well as by virtue of functional limitations that come into
play in the decision-making process of the schools, there are no valid
reasons for withholding a child's school records from his parent. It is well
settled in New York State that a parent has the right to resort to his child's
school records. Certain safeguards as to misunderstanding or to efficient
administration remain available to the schools. They may interpret, if
necessary, the technical nature of certain records, or they may require
reasonable inspection procedures. If a school authority attempts to deny
access to school records, a parent may seek redress in one of two ways: he
may appeal the adverse school decision directly to the local Board of Education or, if need be, thereafter to the Commissioner of Education, or, he
may resort directly to the courts. The first of these alternatives offers the
most efficient and least expensive procedure, and would most likely reverse
the school's decision. There would probably be no need to litigate because
the legal status of the right that has occasioned the foregoing study is clearcut.
Beyond its legal status, however, an examination of the nature of that
right reveals the creative possibilities of legal analogies which suggest that
this parental right may form a part of some of our most basic and cherished
values.
GERALD MoRREALE
prepare a report on the people's right of access (the press being one agent of the

people) to information about their governments and the relationships between governments and people. This well-documented and informative book resulted from that commission. The vast area of newspaper law is only suggested here as a possible field of
analogy which, when pursued at greater length and depth than the scope of this comment permits, might shed greater light upon the nature of a parent's right to resort to
school records. The even more extensive area of "first amendment law" and its relevance
to the topic at hand would involve a separate, lengthy treatment, beyond the present
scope of this comment. Another closely related area of investigation would be the concept of a "right to privacy," involving Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)considerations and arguments dealing with several constitutional provisions (as well as

"emanations" and "penumbras" thereof). These analogous fields of inquiry are merely
suggested here and no present attempt at elaboration will be undertaken. A separate
inquiry into the nature of the parental right examined in this study might, for example,
be based upon constitutional considerations, especially in relation to the so-called preferred
freedoms. For possibilities of "expanding" the preferred freedoms doctrine, see Hyman &
Newhouse, Standards For Preferred Freedoms: Beyond The First, 60 Nw. U.L. RLv. 1
(1965>.

